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AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN CHINA
I.

A NOTE OF EXPLANATION

The title of this paper promises more than I have it in my power to fulfil.
It has seemed best, therefore, to begin with a brief explanatory statement.
An investigation of the international financial and economic relations of
China is now being carried on. It will extend over a number of years, includes a visit to China on my part, and is planned to cover the whole of a
wide and difficult subject.
In the work of this investigation it has fallen to me to deal with American
investments in China. After a brief survey of the situation the conclusion
was forced upon me that I would be obliged to undertake a new and independent study. A considerable amount of work has been done on this new
study, but it is impossible to say whether it will be successfully completed,
since its success depends, in large measure, upon its inclusiveness. In any
case it is impossible to present any of the results at the present time.
In addition to undertaking the preliminary work for a new estimate of
American investments in China I have tried to bring together every estimate
that has been made by others. The number of these estimates is small, but
some of them are for recent years, and the task of finding them has resulted in
the collection of a large number of partial estimates.
In the following pages I present an account of American investments in
China, based upon all of the information available. I have made use of the
results of the investigation now in progress and I have not hesitated to make
a guess or two when it seemed reasonable to do so in the light of these
results.
The members of the Conference are asked to bear in mind this statement
and to regard my paper as the best summary I can make of the results of my
work so far. I hope I am correct in saying that it presents as much information on American investments in China as is possible in the present state of
our knowledge of the subject.
The general comments with which this paper begins are set down in the
hope that they will promote discussion and that the results will reach me in
wr~ting .. It is highly important that those who are working on the study of
Chma'.s. 1~ternational financial and economic relations be given the benefit of
the cnt1c1sm of such a gathering as the present conference of the Institute
o.f Pacific Relations. My own opinion is that the study of China's interna!!Onal economic relations will prove to be the best approach to an understand~ng ?f present-day China. This opinion and the generalizations based upon
tt will, no doubt, be challenged.
The subject of foreign investments in the Pacific was dealt with at the
1927 ~onference ~f the Institute of Pacific Relations and special attention
was _given to fore1gn investments in China. "The chief result of these dis~Slons,:' we are told, "was the realization of the almost complete lack of
tn onnat10n concerning the extent, nature, conditions, and effect of the in5
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vestments actually in existence at the present .time."~ To secure t~is information will be a long task and it may be an Impos~Ible one .. It will ~o~
tinue to require the cooperation of the Institute of Pact.fic RelatiOns an~ It IS
hoped that this cooperation will be given as generously 111 the future as It has
been during the past year.
II. CERTAIN GENERAL COMMENTS

Foreign investment in China presents a whole array of problems o~ a
theoretical, historical and practical sort. They range from narrow tec~mcal
questions in the field of the exchanges to the broadest of problems m the
field of international relations and the relations between different civilizations
and cultures. A number of these problems have been selected for brief comment. Something in the way of background is thus provided, against which
to view the information about American investments which is presented
later.
The economist is likely to view foreign investment as a movement of
capital from one country to another and to give first attention to the mechanism by which this movement is brought about and to the reasons for the movement. He undertakes to answer two questions; namely, why capital movements take place and how they are brought about.
To the second of these questions-that involving the mechanism of international capital movements-a great amount of attention has been given
in the discussions of European economic problems since the war. In these
discussions it is called the transfer problem. I recognize that the subject is
controversial and difficult. Nevertheless, I believe it possible to state the solution of the problem in general terms to which few economists would take exception. A capital movement from one country to another involves both the
export and the import of capital. Confusion and complication will be avoided
if we take the viewpoint of one of these countries. Since we have to do with
China, we may as well select the capital importing country as appropriate to
the occasion.
The import of capital into China involves shifts in China's international
balances of payment and such shifts are ordinarily accompanied and induced
by appropriate shifts in rates of foreign exchange. The transfer to China
ought to mean a fall in the price of foreign money in terms of Chinese
money and, probably, an increase in China's excess of imports.
China is on a silver standard for purposes of international transactions,
and she has been on a silver standard throughout the period of modern
foreign trade and foreign investment. The problem presents itself in this
form : Can we find any trace of the mechanism of international capital movements in Chinese silver exchange? There is also the somewhat more general
question: What has been the consequence of China's silver standard in the
field of capital movements?
1

Problems of the Pacific: Chicago, 1928, p. 139.
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It is improbable that capital movements to China have ever been sufficiently large even for a short period, to create the hope that this effect upon the
Chinese' exchange would repay detailed study. The obligations of the Chinese
Government from the Chinese-Japanese war to the present time have, in fact,
been such as to call for transfers out of China and not into China. Neither
the borrowings to pay the Japanese indemnity nor the obligations represented. by the Boxer Indemnity involved remittances to China. The remittances called for have been the other way. Business investments in China
have been much neglected in discussions of these matters, but it is fairly
certain that no remittances to China on capital account have ever been made
in such amounts as to far outweigh the remittances from China and so provide an opportunity to verify the theory which the economist applies to the
exchanges of a capital importing country.
Among the consequences of China's silver standard in international transactions, under the conditions which have obtained since the seventies of the
last century, is probably some check upon investment in China by persons
in countries whose currency is based upon the gold standard. The Chinese
Government has been obliged to borrow in terms of gold currencies and the
Boxer Indemnity was made an obligation in "gold." This fact creates the
presumption that investments in China of other sorts have been less than they
would have been had China been upon a gold or gold-exchange standard.
One of the conclusions of the Japanese Coinage Investigation Commission
which reported in 1896 upon the effects of the silver standard in Japan was
that there had been "a reduction in the investment of capital made in Japan
from gold countries." 2 The Mexican Monetary Commission of 1903 was of
the opinion that the silver standard was making it increasingly difficult for
capitalists in gold-standard countries to invest in their country. 8 The difficulties of India under silver were in part due to the changes in sterling which
the Indian Government had to meet and these changes were due to some
extent to borrowings abroad. The Commission on International Exchange in
its report on China in 1903 expressed the opinion that both Japan and Russia
had found "the adoption of a stable exchange" a stimulus to investments by
foreigners within these countries. The Commission was firmly of the opinion
that similar results would follow in China and used this as one of the arguments for foreign interest in Chinese monetary reform. 4

Foreign investment in China is subject to so many varied influences that
no one can say how far the adoption of the gold standard would have infl~enced investment in the past or may influence it in the future, but it is
fatrly certain that the gold standard would serve as a stimulus.
: ~atsukaka, Report on the Adoption of lite Gold Standard in Japan : Tokio, 1899, pp. 162· 163,
• Kem~_erer, Modern Currency Reforms : New York, 1916, pp. 484·7.
Stab•hty of International Exchange: 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Doc. 144, pp. 14, 15.
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A different aspect of foreign investments may be introduced by directing
attention to the importance of capital movements in the relations between
developed and undeveloped countries. The attention which has been given
in recent years to the financial state of Europe and to the borrowings of
Germany and other European countries in the United States has tended to
obscure an outstanding characteristic of pre-war investments. Capital investments before the war were in large measure from developed to undeveloped countries and for purposes of economic development. Of course
there are exceptions to this. Loans to the Russian and certain Balkan governments will occur to the reader at once. But loans for political and strategic
reasons have seldom been of first importance. For example, it is probable
that Great Britain in 1914 held about half of the world's international obligations and Sir George Paish estimated shortly before 1914 that, taking all the
facts into account and considering the application of government borrowings,
over sixty per cent of British foreign investments had been employed in the
construction of railways. 5 Other facts might be cited, but it is no doubt a
matter of common observation that capital has moved from developed to undeveloped countries, and that it has been employed chiefly in the introduction
of modern transportation facilities and modern industrial equipment.
Thi · is quite consistent with the answer of the economist to the question :
Why does capital movement take place? The economist reasons that capital
moves from countries where the rate of interest is low to countries where it
is higher. Differences in the return on capital give him his first answer to
the question. The next step in his reasoning involves greater abstraction and,
as is usual in such cases, less general assent. He offers as his explanation
of the differences in rates of interest from country to country the fact that
additional capital available in an undeveloped country will be put to more
"productive" uses than additional capital available in a developed country. In
a world in which capital movements are, as a matter of fact, associated with
some reasonable interpretation of the word "productive," the economist's explanation will be accepted. It is an obvious fact that advances have been
made in international transactions which cannot be regarded as productive.
Moreover, in a particular case, or for a particular country, such advances
may be of outstanding importance. In general, however, the facts justify the
accepted reasoning, and the application of this reasoning to the case of China
will now be undertaken.
No one who is acquainted with economic conditions in China will question the fact that the rate of interest is high there; that capital equipment is
relatively scarce; and that foreign investment has been instrumental in bringing it into the country. This may seem a trite and obvious statement, but it
is worth while to remember, when one is considering the high finance and
higher politics of certain loan negotiations, that the movement of capital to
China is an economic problem.
• Jountal of the Royal Stat. Soc., June, 1911, vol. 74, p. 185.
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Viewed thus, the con~equence of a free moveme_nt of c~pital ~1ust_ be such
· d stria! changes in Chma as to make her economtc and mdustnal hfe more
mu
·
·
·
like that of the Unit~d States ~nd W
. estern E u~ope ..F oretgn
mvestment,
. 111
ther words, is bringmg and wtll bnng changes 111 Chma such as we descnbe
~y the phrase, "the !ndustrial Revolut!on." This mean~ that more and m~re
capital equipment wtll gradually come 111to use; that a htgher standard of hving is to be expected; and that other consequences to which I give attention
below are to be looked for.
Since the modern international relations of China began with foreign
trade, one may say truthfully that the changes which are taking place in
China are the cumulative consequence of her foreign trade. One may trace
the succession of events. Foreign trade brought the steamship to China and
it was soon put to use in the rivers and canals of the country. The steamer
has been followed by the railway and the cotton mill, and these in turn have
led to borrowing by the Chinese Government and the great increase of investment by foreign business men. These consequences have come slowly,
but it is certain that they have come to stay.
They have come to stay because there has been an importation of ideas
into China along with the goods and capital of the foreigner. One might
indulge in speculation upon a question of this sort: When once a group of
Chinese clearly understood the construction and operation of the steam engine, was it not certain that the industrial revolution and its many consequences
would follow? It is well to bear in mind when capital movements are under
consideration that ideas have a power of penetration which is to some extent
independent of steamer and bank. Foreign investment in China is no doubt
having a profound effect upon the rate at which China is becoming industrialized, but it is a fact that China would be moving toward industrialization,
however slowly, if others had not a cent to lend her.
When one has, by a feat of the imagination, seen capital movement as a
part of a long process which began with modern foreign trade and which
will make China, so far as we can see, more like the nations of Western
Europe and America, one is prepared to take the next step and to attempt
an explanation of the rate at which change is taking place. In terms of capital
movement, this means a study of the checks and hindrances to the free movement of capital to China.
. The checks and hindrances upon the side of supply may well be constdered first. It may be that the available capital will be insufficient to support an economic development in China upon a great and extended scale. I
do not _believe this to be the case. The general conditions determining the
rat~ of mterest seem to me such as to make it probable that saving and accumulatto~, that is, the provision of funds, is more flexible and more easily expanstble than is the demand for such funds. 6 The great potential supply of
movable funds may well have its place in the explanation of the eagerness

-

1

See the discussion of this matter in Taussig, Pri11ciples of E cot~omics : vol. II, p. 17; pp. 32-33.
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which the foreigner has displayed at times in the making of loans in China.
It is usual to explain this eagerness on grounds of international political
rivalry and this explanation is no doubt of first importance, but there is a
possibility that an economic factor plays a part. 7 It is possible, in other
words, that the available capital may be a stimulus to, rather than a check
upon, foreign investment in China.
The important checks are rather upon the side of the demand for loanable funds. I realize that this will seem a strange doctrine to those who are
familiar with the eagerness for funds of the military leaders of the immediate past, but it is true, nevertheless. It must be remembered that we have
here under consideration not funds for an impecunious general or for a weak
and unpopular government, but such funds as are for economic development,
for railways, bridges, and mills. The effective demand for economic development is limited and is in turn the chief limitation upon the movement of
capital to China.
This is not true of China alone, but is true in general of undeveloped
countries. It may be put in a convenient phrase by calling it the principle of
capacity to receive. It is in general the capacity of undeveloped countries to
receive capita] which checks its movement and not the potential supply. This
capacity to receive, in China's case, depends upon the social, the economic,
and the political organization of the Chinese people and upon the available
natural resources of the country.
The inadequacy of China's natural resources has recently been set forth
as an ultimate limitation upon the economic and industrial development of the
country. It would, of course, follow that capital movement would be subjected to the same limitation. 8 The available natural resources of China are
not known. It was the fashion some years ago to picture China as a country
with limitless supplies of coal and with other resources in great abundance.
Recent work upon the geology of China has brought about a reaction and it
has become the fashion to look upon China as having the natural resources
for only modest industrial development. I do not think the last word has been
said upon this subject, and we must await the results of further study. And
there is always the possibility that modern industry will be so altered by the
progress of invention as to require natural resources somewhat different from
those which it has required in the past. 9
The limitations upon capital movement which lie in the social organization and traditions of the Chinese people open up a subject which must be
dealt with at greater length. China has offered to foreign trade, to foreign
ideas, and to foreign capital what may be called passive resistance.to This
1
Tht was pointed out with special a}>plica ti on to th e Chinese case by C. A . Conant in his Th1
United S tates in tire Orie"t : Boston, 1900.
1 See B ain, Ores a" d In dustry in the Far East: New York, 1927.
111
This point has bee n made by Condliffe in an address on "Industrial Development in the Far
East," published in the Ch in ese S ocial and P olitical Science Rev .: July, 1928, vol. XII, no. 3.
10 Thi s is set fo rth at grea te r length in my F oreign Trade of Chi,.a: Sha nghai, 1926.
See the
concluding chapter.
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passive resistance seems to me to flow f~om th~ ~~ry .nat~re of Chinese cu~
ture. By this I do not mean that Chmese ctvthzatwn ts by nature antiforeign; what I d? mean i.s that Chine.s~ civilizatio~, being what. it is, has the
property of resistmg foretgn commodtttes and capttal. As foretgn trade and
foreign economic relations have grown, they have, in turn, exercised an
effect upon Chinese social organization. But this is a broad subject which
must be dealt with independently.
The social, economic and political organization of China as it was in the
past may well be called traditional China. 11 The changes which began with
the modern foreign trade of China, and which have brought about foreign
investment and the development of modern industry and modern means of
communication in China, are exerting a profound and, I bdieve, a disintegrating effect upon traditional China. The disintegration of traditional
China is probably the result of other factors as well, but it is my opinion
that the international economic relations of China constitute the factor of
greatest importance.
Traditional China, if we are to believe both Chinese and Western students
of history, had not changed for centuries. No radical transformation in
China, comparable to the decline of feudalism in the West and the rise of
national states, took place in China from the reign of Shih Huang Ti of the
Ts'in Dynasty to recent times. We are told that the political principles and
the ethical and economic thought of the Chinese are still more ancient and
come down to us from the great philosophers of the Chow Dynasty. What is
more, we find that Confucius represents himself as no innovator, but as the
codifier and transmitter of thought which was old in his time. And we are
led back to the days of Yao and Shun to find the origins of the traditions
which may be said to have held universal sway over the Chinese people only
yesterday. One rebels at this and formulates objections, but one is obliged
to recognize the antiquity and the continuity of the Chinese political and social
system.
It is difficult to put the essential features of traditional China into a brief
general statement, but it must be attempted if the disintegrating effect of
modern economic relations with the outside world is to be appreciated.
The outstanding characteristic of traditional China is the importance of
the family. Closely associated with this is the importance of agriculture.
Traditional China is an apparently endless series of agricultural villages in
which the life of the people centers in the family. The family is, of course,
the clan family or the great family and not the family as it has come to be
in the West since the Industrial Revolution. It has been estimated that fourfifths of the Chinese people live in such agricultural villages.l2 To under. u Here I follow the example of T'ang Leang·li. See the title of Chapter VI of his Tloe Foundat•ons of Modern China: London , 1928.

"J. B. Tayler, Farm and Factory in Cltina: London, 1928, p. 19. Professor Tayler's first chapter presents a sympathetic picture of the agricultural village.
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stand the life of these farm villages is to have a keen appreciation of traditional China. There is further reason for giving attention to the farm village.
Changes in the economic state of Chinese agriculture will no doubt be indisputable evidence that the general consequences of the Industrial Revolution are appearing. If a rise in the standard of living is to come about in
China, it must reach the farm village before it can be said to have gone
very far. It is not probable that much evidence can be found of changes in
the standard of living of the Chinese farmer .13
In the small cities of China there are to be found the landed gentry, minor
officials and the handicraft workers. Cottage industry, to which Lieu gives a
separate place, 14 was, I believe, of little relative importance in traditional
China. A few great cities are to be found that are commercial centers and
still fewer that are industrial centers. In these live the higher officials, the
merchants, bankers and the wealthier landed gentry. The commercial and industrial life of the cities was dominated by the guild. The power of the
family was less complete than in the country; it did not cover so wide a field
but it was, nevertheless, the outstanding fact in the social organization.
Throughout traditional China the customs and traditions associated with the
family and with the guild controlled the Chinese people in their daily affairs.
The political organization of the China of the past may be briefly described
as a bureaucracy placed over family and guild. Above the officials was the
emperor and his court. If one were to follow the custom of the German
writers and give the political organization of China a name, I suppose it
might be called a mandarinate. 1 5
The characteristic feature of the mandarinate was the government by
emperor and officials of a vast number of self-governing families and guilds.
To resolve the inconsistency in the governing of self-governing families, one
must understand the nature of government in traditional China. The first
element is the Confucian doctrine of Exemplary Kingship. "The thing that
impresses the reader of the classics, as an outstanding feature of Chinese
political thought, if indeed it is not the outstanding characteristic, is the constant emphasis upon the need and efficacy of personal morality in governing
subjects. Mencius put the matter pithily when he said that it would be as
foolish for a man to rule without practicing morality as it would be to climb
trees in order to catch fish. 16 Good government was the exhibition of virtue
13
Japan is a more highly industrialized country than China and yet it is said of the country
people of Japan that "they remai n chained to the areas, methods, crops, income, and opportunities of
medieval A sia while the possibilities of life in the modern world are in plain view, just beyond their
reach.'' Buchanan, D. H., "The Rural Economy of Japan," in the Q1.tarterly Journal of Bco11.01nics:
August, 1923, vol. 37, p. 571.
14
Lieu, D. K., China's I nd11strics and Finattce: Peking, 19 27, pp. 1, 9·12.
lfS Wittfogel. "Probleme der Chinesischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte," in Archiv f'U.r So:Jialwissen·
schaft ~tnd Sozialpolitik: April, 1927, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 334·5, calls it a Beamtcnstaat or a Ba~tern
und J:Jeamtenstaat.
"Pott, W . S. A., Chinese Political Philosophy: New York, 1925, p. 69.
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so moving as to win the loyalty of the subject and to command reverence.
The West is familiar with the proposition that the end of government is the
good life; in the Chinese classics it is regarded as the means of government,
as well. One must recognize that this is presented as an ideal, but it serves
to bring out the point of view toward government to which traditional China
gave assent.
Another characteristic grew out of the fact that the payment of tribute
has been, throughout the East, evidence of political loyalty. This must be
understood in connection with the fact that aliens have frequently occupied
the throne of China. The payment of taxes in China has behind it this background. It follows that an important duty of the mandarin was the collection
of taxes.
China of the past has been described by Ku Hung-ming as a constitutional monarchy without representation, 17 and the characterization is useful
if one remembers that the constitution lies in the customs and traditions of
family and guild. This constitution, if it may be so called, by its nature
brought it about that traditional China did not have and could not have a
central government of the sort that Europe has had since the rise of national
states and the Industrial Revolution. The Emperor of China held sway over
the families of his people. The officials were his ministers and the payment
of taxes was the evidence that he had a loyal and obedient people.
Much has been made of the right to rebel, which may be regarded as a
sort of representation. The mandate of Heaven was held to be withdrawn
from an emperor whose rule had offended against the customs and traditions
of family and guild, and whose offence was accompanied by plain evidence
that the welfare of his people was being destroyed.
Traditional China, of which I have given a very inadequate picture,
could not and cannot continue to exist in the face of the changes which
began with modern foreign trade and which are now associated with
foreign investment and industrial development. Traditional China might
have adapted itself to modern diplomatic and political relations, if we can
think of these as separate, but traditional China could not adapt itself to
the modern economic world. It is this thesis which I offer as the reason
for my attempt to cover so broad a field.
~rly foreign trade and the foreign relations which grew out of the
foreign trade after the British East India Company lost its monopoly
brought foreign demands for equality of treatment. These demands were
hardly understandable in a political organization that applied guild rules to
trade and regarded the emperor as the Son of Heaven. This was followed
by the demand that treaties must be regarded as binding contracts even
though they were contrary to custom and tradition. This view ran counter
to the "constitution" of the Empire, as the word is used above. So much
"Quoted in Erkes, Ed., China : Gotha, 1919, p. 103.
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has been pointed out by more than one writer. 18 Professor Steiger maintains that "the political and economic theories of the West had, for the
Chinese state, disruptive possibilities equal to those which the modern industrialized nations of Europe and America see in the doctrines of Bolshevism."
The problems raised by the early trade soon became political problems
and the whole question might, it seems to me, have been dealt with largely
in the political sphere if foreign trade had not brought certain consequences
in the economic field.
It brought, in the first place, steamers, railways, factories and modern
mining, the ideas and equipment which go with modern industry. Modern
transportation facilities and modern industrial equipment are bringing territorial divison of labor into a community of economically independent agricultural villages. These changes necessitate economic and political organization on a national scale. Such organization is incompatible with the
maintenance of traditional China.
Modern industrial equipment has come, in part, as the result of the direct
investments of foreign business men and this has brought problems to which
I shall refer presently. In part it has come through loans to the Chinese
Government. Foreign loans have brought the necessity for a new view of
taxation. If a government is to borrow for railway development, operate
railways, and collect taxes to meet its foreign obligations, it cannot succeed
so long as its people regard taxation as they did when it was the gathering
of tribute for the imperial court.
China must have an integrated economic and political system covering
the whole country if she is to meet the problems of modern industry and
the import of capital. An integrated economic and political system on a
national scale is inconsistent with essential features of traditional China.
There is no more interesting and no more practical study than that of the
theories and policies by which China resolves this dilemma, for these
theories and policies will form an important part of the very foundation of
modern China.
I am tempted, before turning to the last of my general comments on
foreign investments, to make an application of my generalizations to the
present political difficulties of China. In the past, revolution in China has
meant resistance to the demands of the emperor and his officials. To rise
against the imperial government was the people's protection and so long as
the Manchus were in power there was the added satisfaction of resisting a
dynasty which was not Chinese. Today the necessary revolution is the
creation of a central government of a sort which has not existed in the past.
When a unified railway system is in existence, or a central bank, free from
the disruptive influences of traditional China, the significant Chinese revolution will have made progress.
11 By no one more clearly than by Steiger in his Chitla and tile Occident : New Haven, 1927, pp.
1, 10, 11. The quotation is from page 10.
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My final comments concern foreign investments as an aspect of the relation between foreigners and Chinese within China. I have in mind the
whole set of phenomena which the words extraterritoriality, treaty ports
and treaty tariff bring to the mind of those who are familiar with the international relations of China.
There is no need to point out how this system arose. The existence of
foreign trade lies behind it. On the Chinese side it grew out of the attempt
to deal with foreign traders by the guild method. The difference between
the legal concepts and the judicial practices of traditional China and of the
Western nations, their conflicting views as to adequate punishment for
criminal acts, have been dealt with by a number of writers. I am interested
rather in the economic aspects of this system and especially in its relation
to foreign investment and the introduction into China of capital equipment
and modern industrial methods.
It has been pointed out above that the nature of Chinese social and
economic organization was such as to offer passive resistance to foreign trade
and foreign capital. The treaty port and extraterritoriality system overcame, or pushed aside, this resistance in a few cities. From this have flowed
certain consequences which are worth consideration.

The position of the foreigner in China has brought it about that China's
foreign relations have been concerned to a surprising degree with events
taking place within China. One has but to turn to the diplomatic correspondence between China and any one of the foreign powers to become
convinced of this. On the economic side this means that problems of increasing economic complexity have had to be dealt with by the methods of
international diplomacy which were not designed to deal with them. This
is true not only of matters of public interest such as the tariff, but of the
rights of a foreign business corporation within China. As MacMurray has
pointed out, "Matters which would elsewhere be of merely commercial
character, susceptible of judicial determination in case of dispute, are in
China matters of international political concern, for the settlement of which
~he ultimate recourse is to diplomatic action." 19 The ultimate problem here
Is the reconciling of the theory of the complete political independence of
states with the hard facts of economic interdependence. The abolition of
extraterritoriality and the Chinese conventional tariff do not solve this ultimate problem. We have only to observe the international economic problems of post-war Europe to become convinced that national independence
does not solve international economic problems.
A further consequence of the position of the foreigner in China is the
fact that foreign investment in China has been in large measure direct investment by foreign corporations and business firms . The slowness of the

-

y ~•llfacl\{urray, J. V. A., Treaties and Agreements with or concerning C!oi11a, 1894·1919 : New
or • 192!, vol. I, p. xv.
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Chinese to make effective use of the corporation and the nature of the
Chinese government are minor factors of importance. The foreign investments of the world are in large part brought about by the purchase in one
country of the corporate and government securities of another. So generally is this the case that estimates of foreign investments in Europe and
America, as, for example, of American investments in Germany, frequently disregard altogether the direct investments of business firms. Such
direct investments are of considerable importance in every case, 20 but in a
study of foreign investment in China they are the first item to be considered.
It may be remarked, also, that direct business investments offer the greatest
difficulties to the investigator for reasons which are obvious.
Direct foreign investment in China was limited before the signing of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. By this treaty the Japanese and, by the
operation of the most-favored-nation clause, foreigners in general secured
the right to engage in manufacturing in the open ports of China. Since
1895 certain of the treaty ports of China have become industrial centers of
considerable importance and this has been, in no small measure, the result
of direct investment by foreigners. It is not improbable that these direct
foreign investments are twice as great as all other forms of foreign investment.
he geographic distribution of modern industrial establishments in
China, the early economic development of Shanghai, and the rapid development of Manchuria are connected with the importance of direct investments
of foreigners under the conditions which have prevailed in China.
I leave it to the reader to supply his own comment on the responsibilities that go with the important part which foreigners have had in the introduction of modern industrial establishments into China. If the system
of treaty ports and extraterritoriality is to continue it is necessary that attention be given to the problems of labor and taxation which are involved.
The relation of foreign loans to the government finance of China and to
railway development has been more generally discussed than any other
aspect of foreign investment, in spite of the fact that direct business investments are of greater quantitative importance. There are a number of reasons for this. The mere fact that there has been more available information about China's government loans than about business investments seems
to explain it in part. A reason of greater importance is that loans to the
Chinese government and especially loans for railway construction have
played a conspicuous part in international rivalries in the Far East. These
rivalries have been seized upon by newspapers and by popular writers. A
whole romantic literature has grown up about these rivalries. They have
played a part in two wars in the East and in the World War. They have
given currency to such phrases as "economic imperialism," "peaceful penetration," and "conquest by railway and bank," phrases which help to explain
the suspicion with which the Chinese have come to regard foreign relations
~ figure of $5,000 million is mentioned by Hall in "The Balance of International Payments
?f the United States in 1928," Trade Information B"lletin No. 625: Department of Commerce, Wash·
mgton, 1929, p. 44.
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of every sort. Here we touch a wide problem, the relation of economic
interests to war, and to the state of the public mind which makes wars probable. The problem is not confined to China, the Far East, or any part of
the world, but it may well be that a re-examination of the course of events
in China will throw some light upon it.
The position of the foreigner in China has developed from earlier trade
relations. These trade relations have, in turn, brought investment and modern industrial establishments. Foreign investment in the securities of the
Chinese government has been to a considerable extent for the financing of
railways. The foreign communities in China are largely communities of
business men. Economic interests. and economic considerations have played
a major part in China's foreign relations. At the same time, it must be admitted that the direct economic effects of these relations seem to have been
small and the effects in other fields to have been greater. This is very
largely because the resistance offered by traditional China to foreign trade
and foreign capital confined them to a few open ports. The whole of
China's foreign trade is small, when the size and population of the country
is taken into consideration. The whole foreign investment in China is by
no means large. But the circumstances under which the trade and investment have grown up and are carried on have given foreign interests in
China a political importance out of all proportion to the direct economic
consequences attributable to them.
No one can attempt to survey the economic consequences of China's
foreign relations without coming to the conclusion that the strong feelings
betrayed by the Chinese and the interested foreigners are to a considerable
degree the result of the political and psychological aspects of the matter.
From the point of view of the foreigner, extraterritoriality comes to be
looked upon as a badge of superiority of the white, Anglo-Saxon or
foreigner; from the viewpoint of the Chinese, it seems to carry with it
the announcement to the world that the Chinese are not quite as good as
other people. When the position of the foreigner in China is seen in these
terms, a cool examination of the possibilities in the situation becomes impossible.
Without attempting to anticipate the results of a more complete ex.aminat_ion of the economic consequences of the position of the foreigner in
Chma, one may offer certain observations. If changes in the position of
the f?reigner are to be made they ought not to be for the purpose of decreasi~g the flow of goods and capital. Whatever may be the political problems mvolved, there is good reason for supposing that the material welfare
of China will be increased by the import of capital. And, it may be added,
Pr?sperous countries have usually found it possible to secure from others
fa1r consideration for their political difficulties.
I have tried to present foreign investment in China by giving attention
!1110 four aspects: ( 1) The movement of capital to China presents problems
the field of the exchanges and of trade balances. These problems are

AMERICAN INVESTMENTS

18

problems of theory and its verification. (2) The movement of capital to
China is an aspect of the relations between developed and undeveloped
countries. (3) Foreign investment in China is a part of the change which
means the disintegration of traditional China. ( 4) Foreign investment in
China is an important aspect of the system of treaty ports and extraterritoriality which has growrt up in China. Its relation to Chinese government
finance and to international rivalries in the Far East has been mentioned.
It is obvious that too much has been said to serve merely as an introduction to the consideration of American investments in China. It is also obvious that too little has been said to make this a finished essay upon foreign
investment in China. I trust it will be accepted for what it is, a statement
of my observations, written down in the midst of my work in the hope that
it will bring criticism and comment from those who are interested in a subject which will grow more important in Pacific relations with every passing
year.
III.

AMSRICAN INVES'l'MEN'l'S IN CHINA

The following account of, American investments in China is based upon
every known estimate of such investments. These estimates are few in
number, as will appear, but, fortunately, several of them are of recent date.
The latest of them was undertaken by the Department of State of the
United States Government within the last two years. A new investigation of
American investments in China is now in progress, but its success is still in
doubt, since it depends upon wide cooperation. It has not been possible to
make direct use of the available results of the new investigation, and none
of the earlier estimates cover the whole field. I have, therefore, combined
totals. and supplemented with information obtained from other sources,
where I could, in order to make this account as complete as possible.
Certain conclusions are to be found in the closing paragraphs. These
are, of course, tentative and it is possible that my final conclusions will be
somewhat different. I have tried to provide the informed reader with sufficient information to enable him to come to his own conclusions as to which
of my generalizations are likely to be modified.
The investments are presented under three divisions. These divisions
have been found useful for both historical and analytical purposes and in
the plans for the investigation now being carried on. Each of the divisions
requires a word or two of explanation.
The first division is Business Investments. This covers all direct investments in China by American business men and corporations. The importance of such investments is a characteristic of the Chinese situation.
They are connected with the existence of treaty ports, extraterritoriality,
and the position of the foreigner in China.
American holdings of Chinese securities and the obligations of the
Chinese Government form the second division. This includes such issues
of Chinese securities as may have been made in the United States and pur-
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chases by Americans of Chinese securities issued in other countries. It includes also advances to the Chinese Government and the sale of supplies to
the Government and to Government institutions. It is plain that no sharp
line can be drawn between certain of these obligations of government institutions for supplies and business investments, since the debts are usually
due to American firms in China. The usual practice has been to include
such debts under this second heading, rather than under the first.
The third division includes the property in China of American mission
and philanthropic societies. There are, in addition, certain educational and
scientific institutions. It may be questioned whether such property represents investment at all. There is no expectation of a monetary return on
the part of its owners, nor is there usually any expectation that the funds
so placed will ever be withdrawn from China. There is thus a sharp difference between mission and business investments which has at times been
blurred by careless writers. At the same time, the purchase of land and
the erection and equipment of buildings in China for mission purposes requires that remittances be made to China. Such remittances play the same
part in the mechanism of capital movement and in China's balance of payments as remittances for business investment or advances to the Chinese
Government. 21 Remittances to China for land, buildings, and equipment
must be dealt with as investments for certain purposes, even if, in the long
run, they prove to be gifts to the Chinese people and not investments at all.
There is an additional reason for observing the matters dealt with in this
division. The value of the property of mission and philanthropic societies
is an index of general American interest in China which may not be neglected without running the risk of presenting a false picture.
I propose to examine the nature and extent of American investments in
China over certain brief periods, or at certain years. For the first of these
periods I turn to Canton shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Nanking and the opening of the five ports.
The trade of those days was small and was largely in the hands of the
British. Morse states that the average for the sixteen years ending in 1833
was $48 million for the combined trade of Great Britian and the United
States, of which the American share was about $8.5 million. 22 It is well
known that the sum of $8.5 million is considerably greater than the actual
~rade between the two countries, for it includes non-American goods brought
111 American ships. 23 Throughout the early trade and, indeed, until the sev21

h In study_ing the mechanism of capital movements all payments for which there is no qu·id pro
quo ave ce:tatn common characteristics, which explains the apparent anomaly in the study of Ger~an reparatiOns when the mechanism of capital movements is under consideration. The anomaly disfppdarsd when we turn to capital investments as the result of differences in rates of return. Mission
un s o not come to China because interest rates are high.
22
Morse, II. B., ltzternational Relations of the Chinese Empire: vol. 1, pp. 89-92.
Tr 0 d%1 Statistics from American sources are brought together in a convenient table in Pan, S.L., Tla.c
e of the U.S. with China: New York, 1924, p. 15.
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enties, the importance of American shipping was an outstanding characteristic of American participation in the trade of China. Morse gives the average number of American ships during the same sixteen years as 37 and of
British ships as 56. American ships, however, represented an investment
in the carrying trade of the world, and not an investment in China.
Turning to Canton in the days of the factories, we find a census of
foreigners and foreign firms for the year 1836 in the Chinese Repository.24
According to this census the foreign population of Canton was 307 and the
number of firms 55. Of the foreign population, 44 were American, and
of the firms, 9, a percentage of 14 and 16 respectively.
Among the nine American firms were Olyphant & Co., Russell & Co.,
and Wetmore & Co. Morse estimates that it required no less than about
$250,000 a year to keep up these establishments. 25
The amount of actual property owned by Americans in Canton during
these years is not easy to estimate. A young American, who was for a
time a partner of Russell & Co. in Canton, wrote home to his mother late
in 1835 giving her an account of a fire which threatened the factories. He
had found it necessary to place the goods of his company on a boat for safekeeping. "We had," he says, "about $300,000 in our treasury and perhaps
$50,000 worth of goods in the house." 26 Another and later fire gives us
additional information. During the events which led to the "Arrow" war,
the Canton factories were completely destroyed in December, 1856. The
claims of the American firms for damages are reprinted in an American
Government document. 27 The largest claim allowed we find to have been
that of Purdon & Co. for $111,000. Another firm was allowed $98,000.
Russell & Co. submitted various statements which show the property of the
firm to have been valued at about $100,000. The total amount paid by the
Chinese Government was Tis. 500,000 ($735,239), of which a part was later
returned to the Chinese Government. 28 The total included other losses than
those by fire at Canton, but the information about individual firms gives us
some idea of the value of the goods on hand. It is probable that the silver
had been removed from the treasuries when the fire took place. 29
The amount of silver at any one time was large, especially before 1827.
I have estimated elsewhere that 60% of the value of the goods brought to
"'Jan., 1837, vol. 5, pp. 426-32.
""Morse, Int. R ei.: vol. 1, p. 83.
"Hughes, Sarah Forbes: L etters a"'l Recollections of John M<lrra y Forbes: New York, 1899,
PI>. _76-7. It is interesting that Forbes began his business career in the China trade and ended it as
chat r an of the board of an American railroad in the Middle West.
21
• .
Message of the Preside"t . of the United States Relative to the Execution of the Treaty witlt
Chona for the Settlement of Clat m s, 40th Congress, 3rd Session. Ex. Doc. No. 29, Washingon 1869.
'
A summary statement of claims is to be found on pp. 158-161.
28
Foster, J, W., American Diplotnacy i1' the Orient, p. 244. The sum paid over in 1885 amounted,
with accrued interest, to $453,400.
""This is Morse's opinion also. Int. R ei.: vol. I, p. 435.
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China by the Americans from about 1800 to 1834 was in the form of silver. so
This percentage was greatly reduced during the later years. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the large amount of silver held by Russell & Co.
in 1835 was characteristic of American firms in general.
The foreign firms of the factory days were not permitted to own either
land or buildings 3 1 but hired buildings from the Chinese hong merchants
at moderate rates. Another factor in estimating investments is highly uncertain, namely, the amount advanced by the hong merchants to the American
firms. Dennett is of the opinion that this was large in the early days of the
American trade. 3 2 It is probable that the Americans were trading on their
own capital after the Napoleonic wars.
Considering all the available information, it may be estimated that American investment in China at any one time during the late thirties, that is, during the closing years of the period before the treaties, consisted of about
half a million dollars in goods and about $2.5 million in silver; say, three
million dollars altogether.
An unconsidered aspect of these early investments is brought out in the
correspondence of John Murray Forbes, who mentions the fact that after
his return to the United States he had the management in his own country
of "about half a million of my friend Houqua's money." 33 This money was
invested, we are told, in American stocks. This adds to the uncertainty of
our estimates for this early period. The total of three million dollars of
American investments in China is no more than a guess.
The period of the seventies of the last century is to be considered next.
By the seventies the Suez Canal had been opened; there was telegraphic
communication between China and the West; steam shipping had become important; and Shanghai had become the chief port for foreign trade. Such
imports into China as cotton yarn and kerosene oil began to increase and to
give the trade the characteristics of a later time. This period marks the
close of the American trade of earlier days. The great American firms
and the New England ships declined in importance or disappeared altogether.
Certain figures will serve as a rough index of the importance of American interests in China. The total trade of China was about the same in
value in 1871 and 1875, and of this total, Hk. Tis. 137 million, the American
share was 7.70jo and 6.3 % for these years. The statistics of the United
10
Remer, C. F., The F or eign T rade of China : Shangh ai, 1926, p. 24.
. 81 MacNair, H . F ., M odern Chinese History-Selected R eadings : Shangha i, 1923, p. 27. MacN atr has reprinted this from W. C. Hunter 's B its o f Old China.
ltl Dennett, Tyler, Americans in Easter n. Asia : New Y ork, 1922, p. 52 .
., Hughes, Sarah Forbes, op. cit ., p. 101. Houqua was the wealthiest of the Chinese hong
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States Government do not give figures for China, separate from Hongkong,
until 1875 when the total trade was 15 million dollars; it did not reach 20
million dollars until 1880. 34
The total number of foreign firms in China during the early seventies
was about 350 and the foreign population about 3,500. In 1874 American
firms formed 14.7% of the total, and in 1877 10.6%. The percentage which
the American population formed of the total foreign population was 15.2%
for 1874 and 10% in 1877. 3 5 These percentages do not differ radically from
those of the Canton days. In 1874 the American missionaries in China
number 210, or about 40% of the American population, 36 and comprised
about the same percentage of the total number of Protestant missionaries
in the country.
American shipping in China gives us the most important single clue to
the total American investment in the country. The total tonnage of the
shipping that came under the view of the Chinese Maritime Customs was
7.3 million tons in 1871 and 11.9 million tons in 1877. Of this total no
less than 43% was American in 1871. A French officer of the Maritime
customs said of the Americans, "it is impossible to compete with their
steamers, except by opposing them by others of the same kind, built on the
same model." Seven out of the nine steamers on the Yangtze were American in 1865. An American boat, the Suwonada, "bears the palm for the
rapidity of her coast voyages." 37 An American official writing ten years
later explained the large American share in shipping as due to the superiority of American models and "the enterprise and good fortune of a few
of our citizens." He concludes his comment by questioning "whether this
interest is not already on the wane."SB
Such was the situation in the early seventies. In 1876 the American
percentage had declined to 24 and in 1877 to 5. The explanation of the
sudden drop from 2.5 million tons to half a million is the sale of the entire
fleet of Ru sell & Co. to the recently formed China Merchants Steam
Navigation Co. 39 The fleet was owned by the Shanghai Steam Navigation Co.
in which Russell & Co. held the chief interest. The sum received for the
boats was Tls. 2 million, but in addition the Shanghai Steam Navigation
Company retained its reserve fund so that they received Tls. 2.4 million.40
At the rate of exchange of the time the sum is about $3 million in United
" Statistics in taels a re from the repo rts of the Chinese Maritime Cus toms and those in dolJars
from rhe Statistical Abstract of the United S tates.
,. Figures from U. S. Government : Report upon the Commercial Relations of the U. S.
1875, pp. 252-3; 1878, p. 238.
88
U. S. Government, Commercial Relations, 1875, p. 253.
81
'reat Britain: Reports from the Foreig,t Comtm'ssioners at the Various Ports in Chi1ta for
the year 1865: London, 1867, p. 137.
"U. S. Gov't: Commercial Relations: 1876, p. 257.
,. It happens that _the steamers of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company were sold to the Jap·
anese Government dunng the same year. Chinese Maritime Customs: Reports on Trade, 1878, p." 99,
•o U. S. Gov't: Foreign Relations, 1877, pp. 87, 90; Commerdal Relations, 1878, p. 212.
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States currency, and we may accept this sum as a part of the American business investments of the years immediately before the sale.
Further information concerning American investments is limited to
Shanghai. We are told in a document of 1856 that "property in houses
and lands to the value of a million dollars is owned by Americans in Shanghai.41 It is probable that this includes both business and mission property.
American property was largely in the part of Shanghai called Hongkew and
the land alone in Hongkew is reported to have been valued at almost exactly
Tis. 2 million in 1880. 4 2 It is not unreasonable to suppose that American
holdings were considerably greater by 1875; say, $2 million.
We know also that in 1882 the land in the International Settlement at
Shanghai and in the French Concession was valued by a local Chamber of
Commerce at Tis. 24 million and the stocks of merchandise at Tis. 32 million. 43 If we suppose that half of the American holdings of land and houses
were for business purposes and that stocks of goods in the hands of American business men were equal in value to their houses and lands, we may add
a sum of $1 million for such stocks and goods. There was at the time no
sale of Chinese securities abroad and there had been in 1874 no loan to the
Chinese Government of which we have record.
The conclusion is that American investments in China, without attempting to separate the property of missions, was around the year 1875,
about as follows: Shipping, $3 million; land and buildings, $2 million;
stocks of goods, $1 million. This makes a total of $6 million and is prob·
ably an underestimate.
I turn next to the years between the Sino-Japanese war and the Boxer
Uprising; that is, to the years from 1895 to 1900. Railroad and industrial
development was still in the future, but the trade had shown great progress
since the seventies. Shanghai had grown in importance, and foreign interests in general were greater. Let us turn to the figures showing the share
of the United States.
For the year 1898 the Chinese Customs statistics show that China's total
trade was Hk. Tis. 369 million, and that the direct trade with the United
States was 6.27o of this, almost exactly the same percentage as for 1875.
The year 1899 saw a great increase in trade and the American share was
9.5%, a higher percentage than for any year since 1871. The American
statistics show the trade to have been about $30 million for these years.
Imports from the United States, it may be remarked, had increased relatively to exports to the United States.
The statistics of foreign population show that Americans formed about
the same percentage of the foreign population as in the seventies and in the
. '~U._ S. Gov't Dept. of State: Report on tlte Commercial Relations of tlte U. S. with all Foretgn atto11s: 34th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. No. 47. Washington, 1856, vol. I, p. 257.
u Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, etc., for the Year 1899: The Daily Press Hongk ong, 1899, p. 138.
'
41
Chronicle & D irectory . . . for tlte year 1899, p. 138.
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thirties: 15.2 in 1898, 13.6 in 1899, and 11.3% in 1900. The number of
firms had grown to 70 in 1899 and 81 in 1900, but there was a noticeable
falling off in the percentage which American firms formed of the total. It
was 5.5% in 1898, 7% in 1899, and 8% in 1900; in the seventies it had been
from 10 to 15%. The presence of certain large American firms may help
to account for this, but it is probable that the chief reason was that mission
activities had grown more rapidly since the seventies than business activities.
My own figures show that the number of American mission societies represented in China increased from 15 to 31 between 1875 and 1900. The number of American missionaries in 1899 was about a thousand. 44
American shipping in Chinese waters continued to decline from the low
point it had reached in 1875 and it was at no time greater than 1% of the
total shipping in the trade. The years 1884 and 1885 are an exception.
Russell & Co. held the fleet of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co.
for a brief period while China was at war with France. 45
We have at best but scattered and incomplete information about American business investments in China. We know that the 70 or 80 American
firms included some of great importance. The Standard Oil Company, for
example, must have had a considerable investment. Kerosene oil had grown
in in.portance as an import and in 1898 about 100 million gallons were
brought in, one-half coming from the United States. Among the other
firms of importance were the American Trading Co. and Fearon, Daniel
& Co. 46 Each of these two firms formed a company to build and operate a
cotton mill in Shanghai. The two mills were in operation in 1899, but by
the end of 1901 one of them had failed. 47 We do not know how much
Chinese and British capital was supplied for these ventures. The total
capital for the two was probably about 2 million Shanghai taels.
We have an estimate which puts the total land value in Shanghai at
about SO million taels for 1899 and the stocks of goods at 60 million taels.
We know also that the funded debt of the Shanghai municipality was about
Tis. 1 million and that most of this was held in Shanghai. There were
in the Settlement about 360 Americans out of a total population of 5,000
foreigners.
The number of open ports in China was 29 at the end of 1898, and we
may suppose that the continued increase in the number of these ports called
for additional American investment:• One is tempted to say that the total
American business investment was more than double that of 1875, but it is
perhaps best not to set down any figure.
"The Christian Ocmpation of China (Shanghai, 1922, p. 346) gives the number of American
Protestant missionaries in China as 513 in 1889 and 1,304 in 1905. The M issionary Review of the
Wor ld (February, 1899, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 93) gives 967 as the number of foreign workers in China
under American societies .
.. Dennett, Tyler (Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 586) notes this fact and deals with certain
general aspects of the decline of American shipping.
•• Said by Lord Charles Beresford (in The B reak·111> of China, New York, 1899, p. 94) to have
been "half English."
. ., Chinese Mariti!"e Customs: Ret1<rns of Trade & Trade Reports: 1898, p. 245, 1901, p. 289;
Dorectory and Cllron<ele . . . : 1899, p. 147; 1905, p. 2 15.
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American holdings of Chinese securities and of the obligations of the
Chinese government probably amounted to little. If there were any such
holdings they were the result of purchases abroad of bonds which were
issued in connection with the three large loans to meet the Japanese indemnity.
The period from 1895 to 1900 was one of fevered, if somewhat ineffectual, activity in the promotion of railway schemes in China. These schemes
must be seen in the light of the political rivalries of the time. Railroad loan
agreements, non-alienation agreements, the leasing of ports to foreign powers were the guns fired in the "battle of the concessions." John Hay's
reassertion of the open-door policy was called forth by the danger of the
partition of China among the powers. It is an interesting fact, and one
which throws light upon the subject of immediate interest, that Hay seems
to have trade in mind and not investments. Dennett is of the opinion that
"there was not enough American money seeking investment to make it
worth while to quarrel about the preferential rights to construct railways
or operate mines which had already been given to other powers." 48 The
importance of investment in connection with the Open Door became clearer
through the years that followed and much study was given to such a formulation of the policy at the Washington Conference as would cover the
movements of capital, as well as those of goods.
In 1900 the Americans had one important railway loan contract which
they were to lose, that for the construction of the Canton-Hankow Railway.
They had had earlier opportunities but these had come to nothing. The
Canton-Hankow agreement in its original form was signed on April 14,
1898, within a few days of the beginning of the Spanish-American War.
After some delay a preliminary survey was made and in July, 1900, a supplementary agreement was signed, increasing the sum involved. 4 9 This supplementary agreement contained an article (the 17th) which provided that
"the Americans cannot transfer the rights of these agreements to other nations or people of other nationality." When, by the purchase of shares in
New York, the Belgians acquired control of the American China Development Co., the Chinese demanded the cancellation of the agreement. J. P.
Morgan & Co. secured the control of the Company, but the Chinese insisted on getting things back into their own hands and bought out all property of whatever sort of the China Development Company in China for
the stun of $6.75 million. 50 There have been charges of bad faith in connection with the acquisition of control by the Belgians. Without seeking
to defend the interested Americans, I venture the opinion that no one can
u Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Easter11. Asia, p. 648.
"Texts in Rockhill, W. W., Treaties atld Conventions: Washington, 1904, pp. 252 259 . The
agreement cancelling the concessions is in Mac:h.{urray. Treaties and Agreements: Vol. ( p. 519.
.
.. Certain bonds of the Chinese Government retained by Americans at the time played a part
•n the IIukuang Railway Loan Agreement.
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go through the history of the Canton-Hankow Railway Loan during these
years without coming to the conclusion that the underlying cause of the difficulty was that capital for such foreign ventures was extremely scarce in
the United States in 1900. If American funds had been available the Company would, in all probability, not have had its other troubles.
This failure, and others which preceded and followed it, may be said
to have been caused by the lack of funds seeking investment in the United
States and by the fact that railroad and other contracts in China had a value
and importance-for reasons connected with policies, strategy, and prestige-out of proportion to their economic value. If one is to explain the
political moves upon economic grounds, one must look for an ultimate
rather than an immediate economic motive. The immediate cause of activity
in the economic field seems, in this case, to have lain outside the economic
field.
Concerning American missionary activities in China at the beginning of
the year 1900, we know that there were about 1,000 missionaries representing 31 societies. This is to be compared with 210 missionaries representing
15 societies in 1875. There were about 60 American mission hospitals in
China at the time, about half of the total number in China. It is probable
that .nore than half of the educational institutions were American. The total
number of "students in Christian schools" was reported in The Christian
Occupation of China to have been 10,000 in 1889 and about 30,000 in 1905. 51
No one undertakes to give either the total value of mission property in China
or the amount of the remittances to China for mission and philanthropic purposes. We find in statements concerning the property that it must have been
worth many millions of dollars. The American societies were awarded $570,983.75 in the Boxer Settlement and it is well known that only a small part
of the total mission property was destroyed in 1900. 5 2 If one were to guess
at the total value of American mission property in China at the end of 1899
he would probably put it at from $10 to $20 million. I will not venture to
guess at the total business investment, and the American holdings of Chinese
securities were so small as not to deserve consideration.
By the year 1914 important changes had taken place in China, but the
later effects of the Chinese revolution had not made themselves manifest.
Europe was on the eve of a war which was to involve the world and alter the
position of the foreigner in China. It will be worth while to attempt an
estimate of American investments in China as they were at the end of 1913.
The foreign trade of China in 1912 and 1913 was twice as great as it had
been in 1898 and 1899. The American share of this increased trade was
about twice what it had been at the earlier date and in the seventies. Imports
•• The Christtan Occupation of Chi11a: Shanghai, 1922, p. 346. 'l'he estimates of 1899 are based
upon Beach, H. P., "China as a Mission Field," Missionary Review of the World : Feb., 1899 , vol.
12, no. 2, pp. 86·98, and table on page 93; and upon Dennis, J. S ., ,.Missions in China," Rev. of
Rev.: N. Y., Sept., 1900.
•• Latourette, K . S., A History of Christian Missions in Chi,.a: N. Y ., 1929, p. 253. 'l'he amount
awarded was more than half again as large as the claims of the societies.
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from the United States were now usually about equal to exports. This increase in the relative importance of imports probably meant increasing American business investments in China.
The number of Americans in China continued to grow, as did the number
of American firms. The customs statistics give the number of American
firms as 131 in 1913 and the number of Americans as 5,340. For 1914 the
figures were 136 and 4,365. It is when we turn to the percentage these figures
formed of the totals, that we encounter an important difference from the
situation in 1900. In 1899 Americans formed 13.6% of the foreigners in
China and in 1913 no more than 3.2%; American firms were 7% of the total
foreign firms in 1899 and only 3.4% in 1913. The chief reason was a great
increase in the Japanese and Russian population in China and in the numbers
of Japanese and Russian firms. There had been no important change in the
American position in relation to the interests of the Western European
nations. American shipping in 1912 and 1913 was still no more than about
1% of the total reported by the Chinese customs.
An examination of the available statistics shows that the missionary and
philanthropic activity of American societies increased as rapidly or perhaps
more rapidly than did business activity. American missionaries in China
numbered about 2,500 in 1914, about 40% of the total American population. 53 For the years now under consideration we have somewhat more information than for 1899, but comparison is difficult. The number of missionaries was two and one-half times that in 1900. The number of hospitals
supported by Americans had increased from about 60 to 200. The number
of schools maintained by Americans was probably three times the number in
1900. An estimate of the value of the plant and equipment of five important
American institutions of higher education for 1914 put the total at $1.5
million. 54 The property of the American Y. M. C. A. was reported at about
the same time to have been $1 million. 55 It is estimated that American mission societies were remitting to China at the rate of about $3.5 million in
1916, and that four important American societies remitted $1.8 million in
1917 or 1918. 56 If later figures may be accepted, the value of mission property may be estimated at about eight times the annual remittance, and this
would give us $28 million as the total value of mission property. Some such
figure may be held reasonable on other grounds as well. So we come to an
estimate of about $25 million for the 1914 value of the property of American
mission and philanthropic societies in China .
011

.
Estimates of 2,309 for 1915 and 2,858 for 1916 are to be found in Arnold, Julean Comtllereta.1 Ha>Jdbooll of Chi1ta: Washington, 1919, val. I, p. 423, and vol. II, p. 288. In the 'references
wlach follow, the two editions of this book will be distinguished by giving the date in each case .
.. Commercial Handbook of China: 1919, val. II, p. 429 .
.. Commercial Handbook of Clti"a: 1919, vol. I, p. 288.
; Clti1ta Mission Year Booll: 1919, p. 297. Commercial Handbooll of China: 1919, vol. I p. 287··
1
~~: h' p. 423. 'l' he last ref_erenc~ is . to ~n estimate _by Dr. Frank Rawlinson of $3.572,780 for 1916
• •c . was ~ased upon an mvest1gattOn 10 Shangha1. See also Sammons, Thomas. "American Mis·
6
IZ0~~ ~n Chma," Mil/ards Review (later Chit~a Weekly Review), July 7, 1917, val. I, no. 5, Pi>-
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It is impossible with our present information to make an estimate of
American business investments for 1913 which can be defended. It has been
pointed out that there were some 130 American firms in China and that the
American population was over 5,000. American trade with China amounted
in 1913 to Hk. Tls. 73 million, according to Chinese statistics, and to $65
million, according to American statistics. Trade with the United States
formed 7.6% of China's total trade in 1913. It had risen in 1905 to 15%,
but this rise was connected with the Russo-Japanese War. The trade in
kerosene doubled between 1899 and 1913 and the American share of this
doubled trade had increased.
The foreign population of Shanghai in 1910 was 13,436, and the American population 940; for 1915 the figures were 18,519 and 1,307. 57 There
was now an American bank in China, the International Banking Corporation,
with a branch at Shanghai and four other branches in the country. When
this bank was taken over by the National City Bank of New York in 19165 8
it had capital, surplus, and undivided profits of about $8 million, but it must
be borne in mind that it had branches in Europe and South America, as well
as in the Far East. 59 American banks had suffered certain disabilities before
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and certain supplementary acts. An
An,erican Chamber of Commerce was formed in 1915 with a membership
of 32 firms. 60 Such evidence may be multiplied, but it cannot be more than
the most unsatisfactory indicator of the extent of American business investments. One is inclined to the opinion that they cannot have been much less
than the value of the property of the mission societies.
American holdings of Chinese Government securities may be estimated
with fair accuracy. The period from 1900 to 1913 saw many ventures in
which Americans were interested, come to nothing. The Canton-Hankow
concession has been dealt with. Other plans which would have involved
American capital if they had been successful were associated with Manchuria.
The reasons for American interest in Manchuria probably are not easy to
find on the simple theory that capital follows trade or on the theory which
has sometimes been advanced that capital follows the missionary. No American interest actually in China serves to explain the Manchurian proposals. It
is probable that American attention to Russian ambitions in this region at
an earlier time brought Manchuria to the attention of Americans, and that the
continued centering of international political attention upon Manchuria
served to keep it there. Political interest, which involved ultimate economic
interest, probably was behind the financial proposals.
The first American proposal may well be cited as an exception to my gen57

Chi11a Year B ook: 1914, p. 658. China Year Book: 1916, p. 617.
Lee, Frederic C., Currcnc)', Banking, and Finance in China: Washington, 1926, p. 94.
Bennett, R. C., uAmerican Banks taking their Place in China," China Weekly Revietv Sutplemc11t: June 30 , 1923, p. 10. America's First Foreign Banking Venture, Millards (late r Chin!J
Weekly Rcvietu): March 23, 1918, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 110, 111.
00
"Annual Report of the President." Millards (later China Weekly Review): June 19, 1920,
vol. 13, no. 3, p. 119.
M
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eralization. It was Harriman's plan for a round-the-world transportation
system. It was probably a business venture of an American sort, made at a
time when American business methods were less popular abroad than they
have become. One may suppose a continental observer saying of this and
Secretary Knox's plan that they were attempts at "rationalization" under unfavorable circumstances. The failure of Mr. Harriman's plans and the ambitions of Willard Straight brought about the attempt to put through a joint
British-American project for a railroad from Hsi1m1intun to Aigun. The
British contract for the line from Hsinmintun to Fakumen was signed in
1907, but the Japanese prevented its being carried out, relying upon certain
secret protocols attached to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December, 1905. 61
The wider issues involved can not be dealt with here, and the informed reader
will have reflected upon them.
The Knox plan 62 for the rationalization of the Manchurian railways and
the Chin Chow-aigun proposal 62 met with the opposition of Japan and Russia.
It is probable that political considerations and the economic interests of both
powers, whether the economic interests were real or not, explain the failure of
these projects. It would not have been easy to finance large projects in the
United States, but there would no doubt have been sufficient funds for any
of these proposals. We may conclude that these projects differ from the
early Canton-Hankow project in that the motive for them and their failure
is not to be found in the lack of investment funds in America, but in the international political situation in the Far East. And, it may be added, the
situation in the Far East was thought of in terms of the politics of Europe.
The Manchurian efforts of the United States and the keen interest of the
Taft administration led to American entrance into the three power group
which undertook to finance the Hukuang Railways. These comprised the
Hunan section of the Canton-Hankow and the Hupeh section of the Hankow-Ichang Railway. President Taft added a touch of the spectacular to the
negotiations by a personal telegram to the Chinese ruler in which he requested "equal participation by American capital in the present railway
loan." 03 This was arranged and the Four Power group-the Old Consortium
--<:arne into existence. The Hukuang Railways loan contract was signed on
May 20, 1911,64 The American interest in Manchuria had continued and the
American banks had signed a preliminary agreement for a currency reform
and industrial development loan on October 27, 1910. 65 This agreement was
turned over to the Consortium. Since Manchuria was involved the Japanese
and the Russians were interested and they made successful efforts to enter
~onsortium. 66 Since Japan and Russia were both capital importing
b k" ~Villoughby, W. W., Foreign Rights and Interests in China: Baltimore, 1920, pp. 312· 14. Horn/c I' : K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East: N. Y., 1916, pp. 259·60. The whole chapter
ea s .. Wlth the proposals under discussion.
F
'·RBoth dealt with in Secretary Knox's letter of Nov., 1909, to. the British Government. U. S.
or.
elatrons: 1910, p. 234.
.. The telegram is reprinted in Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in Chi,.a: Baltimore,
1920• p. 551.
: MMacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. I, p. 866.
acMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. I, p. 851.
11
Agreement of June 18, 1912. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreeme11ts: vol. II, p. 1021.
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nations, one is led to reflect upon the nature and the functions of the Consortium.
This Six Power group soon entered into negotiations for the Reorganization Loan, 67 but a change of administration in the United States brought about
the withdrawal of the American banks before the loan contract was signed.
In a statement given to the press in explanation of President Taft's telegram, the Secretary of State had given as one reason for American insistence the fact that the Hukuang Railways loan was different from earlier
loans. It involved the general revenues of the Central Government of China
and earlier loans had not. It was desirable for the United States to participate, for important questions might arise as the result of the nature of the
pledge. ss In the reply of the American Government to the request of the
American group of bankers for support, dated March 18, 1913, we are told
that one reason for the withdrawal of such support lies in the fact that certain Chinese revenues are pledged. These revenues rest upon taxes which are
to be administered by foreign agents and the conditions of the loan "touch
very nearly the administrative independence of China." 69 Here we have
neatly illustrated a dilemma which has confronted America throughout the
history of her relations with China. Will American policy be forwarded best
by cooperation, by insisting upon cooperation, if necessary, or by independent
action, by refusal to cooperate upon occasion? This has been erected by some
into a choice of policies. It is, rather, a choice of methods and no general rule
is possible. The opposition in a modern government, to use an analogy, cannot determine in advance whether it will compromise or fight. It depends.
The Reorganization Loan of 1913 carried provision for the repayment of
advances made by the Six Power Group while the loan was under negotiation and for the repayment of certain provincial loans. This disposed of any
American holding of government obligations to April, 1913. The Americans
had taken part in a loan of Shanghai Tis. 3,500,000 to the Shanghai Taotai
in 1910 and in the Hupei Provincial Loan of 1911 for Hankow Tis. 2,000,000.70 The repayment of outstanding obligations left them, so far as the
records show, with only the American share of the Hukuang Railways loan
outstanding. We may be fairly certain that no new loans were made during
the remaining months of 1913, for, as a Chinese student of the subject remarks, American finance in China reached "a period of total stagnation"
with the withdrawal of government support.71
The American holdings of Chinese securities may be arrived at by setting
down the American share in the Hukuang Railways loan. There may have
"Contract signed by the Five Power group in April, 1913. Text in MacMurray, Treat ies and
Agreements: vol. II, p. 1007 .
.. ". 'he statement is reprinted in Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China: ed. of 1920,
pp. 551-2.
68
Text in MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. II, p. 1025.
"MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. I. pp. 805 and 902.
11 Tan, S. H., The Diplomacy of American Investments in China. This is an unpublished dissertation of 1927 in the Library of the University of Chicago. My references to it are few because
it is not generally available. It ouiht to be published.
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been American holdings of earlier securities floated in Europe, but I am informed by American bankers that they were few before the end of the war
in 1918. The Hukuang loan was for £6,000,000. The rate of interest was
5%. It was shared equally among the interested countries and the redemption
of the loan was to begin in 1922. The amount outstanding was $7,299,000,
on January 1, 1914.
Any recapitulation serves to commit me to a more definite statement than
I care to make. If I were obliged to estimate American investments in China
as of January 1, 1914, I should offer the following figures with the understanding that they may be drastically revised as a result of further investigation: Business investments, $25 million; American holdings of Chinese
securities, $7,299,000; property of mission and philanthropic societies, $25
million. The total I would put between $50 and $60 million.
The final period to be considered is that since the European War. It may
be called the present if the term can be stretched to cover the years since
1925, for much of the detailed information goes back to that year. The lack
of late information is less damaging to the present value of the study since
it is the general opinion that very few foreign loans have been negotiated by
the government now in power in China.
The European war brought a remarkable increase in American trade
with China and in other American interests in that country. This was followed by a sharp decline in 1921. More recently there has been steady
growth at a higher level than before the war. Between 1913 and 1927 the
trade of China more than doubled and the American share in that trade
doubled also. This is borne out by the American statistics which show an increase from $54 million in 1912 and $65 million in 1913 to $263 million and
$245 million in 1926 and 1927. The only available figures for 1928 show a
total trade for the United States with China, Hongkong, and Kwantung of
$321.8 million. 7 2 A characteristic of American trade with China during this
period was a return to the import-export relation of the 19th century. China's
exports to the United States exceeded her imports from the United States
until 1928. The percentage of China's trade which was with the United
States was 17% in 1926, and 15% in 1927.
A similar change is recorded in the field of shipping. From the eighties
~ntil 1918 American shipping was regularly 1 % or less of the total shipping
m the Chinese trade. In 1920 it reached 5%, and in 1927 it was just under
5% . There was in 1928 an American company with steamers on the upper
yangt_ze, and the Standard Oil Company is reported to have had 12 boats
111 Chmese waters. 73 That the increase in American tonnage on the Pacific
was the result of American activities during the war needs no comment.
The number of American firms in China is reported by the customs to

-

72

F b Mann, Lawrence B., "Geographic Distribution of Foreign Trade in 1928," Commerce Reports:
e · 25, 1929, p. 462. The corresponding total for 1927 was 278.2 million.
'~~rcat Britain, Dept. of Overseas Trade, Ch i11a: L ondon , 1928. Page 29 states that II Ameri·
cans tps were on the upper Yangtze. Standard Oil boats are listed in Chi11a Year Book: 1928, p. 722.
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have been 551 in 1927, and the American population in China to have been
6,970. The year 1925 is perhaps a better one to judge by since many American residents were away during 1927. In 1925 the customs statistics report
482 American firms and 9,844 residents. American firms were 6.2% of all
foreign firms in 1925, and 7.3 % in 1927. The percentage which the American population formed of the total was 2.9 in 1925, and 2.3 in 1927. The
percentage of American firms was again what it had been in 1899, but the
great Russian and Japanese population of Manchuria kept the population
percentage low.
The American authorities give figures which are somewhat larger. The
1926 edition of the C01nmercial and Industrial Handbook gives 12,530 as
the population and 617 as the number of firms. A list of American firms in
China compiled by the Department of Commerce in August, 1928, includes
660 firms. About SO% of these firms were in Shanghai where American business has had its center since the middle of the last century, and the number
in Manchuria was about 10%.
The American missionary population in China was about half the total
American population before 1927, that is, 6,000 missionaries in a total
American population of 12,000. This is to be compared with 1,000 missionaries in 1900, and 2,500 in 1914. One of the results of the war was to increase the number of American Catholic missionaries. In 1908 a Franciscan
priest reported that "he knew of only seven American Catholic missionaries
in the Empire." 74 The latest estimate is 269 for a recent year. 75 The number of hospitals in China supported by American Protestant societies was
152 in 1919 and the number of schools so supported may be indicated by
stating that there were 193 middle schools for boys. 7 6
It is not necessary to enumerate schools and hospitals for this recent
period, for we have estimates of the value of mission property and of remittances to China for the work of philanthropic societies. The work of preparation for the Washington Conference included the drawing-up of an
estimate of the amount annually expended for philanthropic and educational
work in the Far East. The amount so remitted by the leading societies for
the latest year for which statistics were available was $7,345,597. 77 Another
estimate by A. L. Warnshuis, published in 1927, puts the annual expenditure of "American Missionary Agencies" at "not less than $10 million." 7 S
These totals, I believe, take into account the expenditures in China of the
Rockefeller Foundation. It is not so certain that they take into account the
increased contributions of American Catholics, but I can find no separate
estimates of the amount of such contributions that went to China. The
,. Latourette, History of Christian Missions in Clti11a: p. 540.
1
~ Goodrich, C., "American Catholic Missions in China," Cit. Soc. & Pol. Sc. Rev.: vol. XI,
no. 3, p. 427.
"Christian Ocmpation of Chi11a: pp. 346-7.
"Patton , C. H., The Business of Missions: N. Y., 1924, p. 192.
18 Warnshuis, A. I.,., "Christian Missions and the Situation in China," A1mals of tire A mer.
A cad.: July, 1927, vol. 133, p. 81.
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American Red Cross has at times spent considerable sums in China, but during the past few years the amount has been small. 70 The available estimates
put the remittances to China of American mission and philanthropic societies
at about $10 million a year.
The total value of the property in China of these societies has been estimated also. One estimate which I believe to have been made some years ago
by A. L. Warnshuis is that "the capital invested in schools, colleges, hospitals, churches, houses, and lands is . . . approximately $80 million." 80 This
must be compared with the estimate of the State Department. This estimate
gives the total for reports received to October, 1928, as $52,109,073 for
philanthropic and mission investments. It is probable that the estimate of the
State Department is more carefully made and that the higher value of silver
at an earlier time helps to explain the $80 million estimate. In any case, we
have the two estimates of $50 million and $80 million.
When we turn to the estimates of business investments we find differences which are more difficult to explain. We have every reason to suppose
that American business investments were several times as large in 1928 as
in 1914. The trade statistics, the number of firms, and the amount of American shipping have already been dealt with. The number of American banking corporations doing business in China is four. 81 The effect of the war is
illustrated by Lee's comment that when he began his investigation there were
seven and that the number had since been reduced to four.8 2 The China
Trade Act has provided for the federal incorporation of American companies doing business in China.8s American chambers of commerce exist in
seven of the open ports of China and there is a central organization known
as the Associated American Chambers of Commerce in China which was
created at Shanghai, October 23, 1922.84 Americans are the owners of industrial plants and office buildings in Shanghai and Tientsin and of such
institutions as the American school at Shanghai.
The total value of such business investments was estimated for about
1924 by Lee, who had spent "the major portion of the years 1921 and
1922" 85 in China. "The investment of American firms operating in China in
lands, buildings, and other equipment, other than stocks on hand, is extremely difficult to estimate. The known investments of the larger firms
amount to $20 million gold. A conservative estimate of the total of such
holdings would therefore be around $30 million gold."86
~e estimate of the State Department is not to be compared with Lee's
th" Ball, Ray, Tire Bala>~ce of Int. Payments of the U. S. in 1928, p. 35, states payments abroad
e American Red Cross t o have been $517,817 in 1928.
"'Warnshuis, A. L ., of!. cit., p. 81.
: Commercinl Handbook of Chit~a: 1926 ed., p. 172.
Lee, Currency, Banking and Fi>1ance in China: p. 93.
51
Ch. Reprinted as amended in February, 1925, in an appendix to the Commercial Handbook of
Ba;;~a, ed. of 1926, p. 783, and discussed by Willoughby, Foreig11 Rights a"d I nterests ;,. Chi11a:
•more, 1927, vol. II, pp. 930-942.
:China Weekly Review : Oct. 28, 1922, vol. XXII , n o. 9, p. 304.
Lee, of!. cit. IX .
.. Lee, op. cit., p. 123.
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estimate without making allowance for the fact that it does include the value
of stocks of goods on hand. Otherwise, I believe, the two cover the same
field and may be regarded as estimates of the property in China owned by
Americans. The State Department's estimate for "Business Investments" is
$95,352,836 and I shall refer to it as "the $100 million estimate."
It is probable that Lee would have added a sum equal to his estimate if
he had been asked to estimate the value of the stocks of goods on hand and
in the possession of American firms in China. The difference must be attributed to his unwillingness, which is quite understandable, to make a rash
estimate. If we accept the estimate of the State Department as representing
the facts, do we then have a satisfactory estimate? The answer to this
question depends in part upon one's interpretation of the term "investment."
It seems to me a defensible point of view to accept as international investments all movements of funds from one country to another which are
the result of differences in rates of return on capital and which in turn cause,
in the present or future, movements of funds in the opposite direction. The
valuation of such investments may be in terms of the original movement of
funds or in terms of the later and opposite movement of funds. This means
that American investments may be valued according to the payments which
were made to bring them into existence or they may be valued according to
the return they bring to their American owners. It seems to me more reasonable to value them in terms of the return they bring. This means a capitalization of the net income of American business investments in China. In the
language of the business man it means taking into account good will.
The estimate of the State Department is a valuation of American physical
property in China, which did not take into account good will or return to the
investor. A recent transaction gives us some information concerning
good will.
The newspapers have reported recently the purchase by American interests of the plant of the Electricity Department of the Shanghai Municipal
Council. The price to be paid is Shanghai Tls. 81 million or about $50
million. When these payments have been made there will have been added
to American business investments in China, by this one transaction, a considerable fraction of the earlier business investments. This must be recorded
here, although it comes later than our most recent estimate.
The bid of the American and Foreign Power Co. was commented upon
in the press of Shanghai during the past few months and it has been said that
it was from two to three times the value placed upon the physical plant of
the Electricity Department. It is plain from this that physical valuation
alone does not represent the investment in this case. I will not attempt to
apply this ratio to the estimate we have of the value of American business
property.
We may leave the subject of business investments with the general statement that the latest estimate available puts the direct investments under this
heading at about $100 million.
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Certain agreements which have been abandoned would have brought into
existence investments difficult to classify. They would have involved business investments, but in such terms as might at any time have involved the
Chinese Government. The agreement between the Chinese Government and
the Standard Oil Company for the exploitation and operation of oil fields
in certain provinces is an example. 87 It would have brought into existence
a corporation whose stock was held by the Standard Oil Company and the
Chinese Government. A similar contract is that between Henry Hussey, acting on behalf of an American syndicate, and the Chinese Government. 88
We come next to American holdings of Chinese securities and the obligations of the Chinese Government to Americans.8 9 To arrive at a total I have
accepted the information given in various published lists which may be generally accepted as reliable. It is possible that a student who had been in
close touch with the financial transactions of the Chinese Government during
the past year, some one in the Ministry of Finance, or someone on the
Kemmerer Commission which has been in China since January, 1929, could
make corrections. I assume that the present Chinese Government has not
attempted to select certain unsecured obligations for payment, but will await
the results of a complete study. One would suppose this from the way in
which the subject was dealt with at the Chinese National Economic and
Financial Conferences held in Shanghai in 1928, 90 and from the fact that
foreign debts are among the subjects to be dealt with by the Kemmerer
Commission. I assume also that few new foreign obligations have been undertaken by the present government. This seems the more reasonable when
it is understood how rapidly the internal obligations of the Chinese Government have grown in recent years. It is estimated that on July 1, 1928, the
outstanding internal loans of the "Peking" Government amounted to $208
million, Chinese currency, while outstanding internal loans of the "Nanking"
Government were no less than $301 million.91 It seems evident from this
that the chief reliance of the present government has been upon borrowing
within China.
For the secured loans we have a recently published list by E. Kann and
J. Baylin, which Mr. Kann of Shanghai has kindly made available. For unsecured loans and other obligations I have accepted the lists as published in
the China Year Book, 1928. There are two lists; one showing obligations
according to the Chinese Financial Readjustment Commission ( 1927) and
87 MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. II, p. 1109.
(See note cancelling the agreement
and creating obligation of the Chinese Government for the payment of $543,703.89 on p. 1111.)
88 Printed as Annex XII to List of Cotltracts of American Nationals Submitted 11nder Resolr<tio"
XI of the Conference o" the Limitation of Armament: Washington, 1925. A similar plan may have
been behind a venture of the Orient Mines Company which is listed by Eldridge, F. R., Trading
Wlt/• Asia: New York, 192 1, p. 399.
89 Negotiations which did not resu lt in loans have in most cases not been mentioned, even when
their political importance is great, as in the case of the form ation of the new Consortium in 1918.
'"I am informed that the Chinese Government expects to publish English tran slations of the
Proceedings o f their conferences shortly. Mr. K. K. Liu, a student at the University of Michigan,
has been kind enough to go over the Chinese text with me.
91
Commerce Reports: August 5, 1929, p. 325. The figures, we are told, were "compiled by a
large American financial concern."
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the foreign delegations to the Tariff Conference of 1926; the other showing
the obligations of the Ministry of Communications.
The results of the study of these lists of obligations is shown below:
AMERICAN LOANS TO CHINA
I. SECURED LoANS AS oF ]AN. 1, 1929
Date of
Issue Mat'y

-- -

Denomlnatlon of
Loan

1911 1951 Hukuang Railways
1919 1921 Republic of China
Treasury Notes of
1919
1919 1921 Republic of China
Gold Notes of 1919

%

Countries Involved

American
Agency

Amer. Share
Outstanding
ln u.s.$

5 England, France, The American $ 7,512,670
Germany, U. S.
Group
8,261,760
Continental &
6 United States
Commercial
Tr. & Sav.
Bk. of Chicago
Pacific Devel8,497,500
6 United States
opment Corp.
TOTAL $24,271,930

II. UNSECURED LOANS AS OF DEc. 31, 1925
U.S.$ ·
67,555.00
Washington Banks for Educational Expenses ............................. .
20,000.00
Munsey Trust Co., Educational Expenses ......................................
Grand Canal Improvement Loan ..................................................... . 1,242,956.96
American International Corporation
Chuchow-Chingchow Railway ...................................................... .. 1,630,209.56
Siems and Carey
TOTAL $2,960,721.52
III. OBLIGATIONS TO AMERICAN FIRMS, AS OF DEC. 31, 1925
LIST oF DELEGATION To TARIFF CoNFERENCE AND FINANCIAL
READJUSTMENT CoMMISSION
U. S. $
American Trading Co., (Shanghai Mint) ..................................... lS 702,349.22
63,258.80
American Trading Co. (Hankow Paper Mill)..............................
3,568.68
Wah Chang Trading Corporation (Shanghai Mint) ..................... S 203,548.34
l 17,601.70
Hsin Fou Co. (Shanghai Mint)........................................................ 29,163.50
Anderson, Meyer & Co. (Hankow Paper Mill)..............................
1,953.98
American Metal Co. (Canton Mint)................................................ 676,247.91
American Trading Co. (Anking Mint) ............................................ 186,376.97
American Trading Co. (Lungyen Iron Mining Co.) ................... S 72,927.43
l 3,649.83
America Trading Co. (Bureau of Engraving)............................ 16,204.69
Anderson Meyer & Co. (Ministry of War)..................................
8,298.10
Anderson Meyer & Co. (Aeronautical Dept.)................................
3,051.14
Ault & Wiborg (Bureau of Engraving) ....................................... S 22,774.06
l 21,489.04
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E. W. Frazar (Ministry of War) ................................................... .
Pacific Development Corporation (Hunan Mining Bureau) ........
T. M. Wilkinson Co. (Wharves at Foochow) ·------------------------------Curtis Aeroplane & Motor Co. (Training of Naval Cadets) ....... .
Subtotal

3,046.74
60,000.00
30,000.00
9,448.34

2,134,958.47

List of Ministry of Communications :

$ Chinese Currency
Baldwin Locomotive Works ---------·------------------ ----·····-······------------ 3,843,084.76
W. W. Fowler ------------------------------ ----·-------··--·--· -·· -·---·- --·-----·-·--·---- 2,305,584.64
American Locomotive Co. ---- --- -- --------- ---------·---- --·----------------------- 3,189,320.90
Steel Products Corporation -----·---···----------··-----------·-··-----··------ -- ---- 1,590,574.00
W. W . Fowler Co· --------------· -------------------------·--- -- ---------------------------- 4,077,812.06
W. W. Fowler Co ......--------· --· ------- --·-------··----------------------·------·--- --- 900,493.14
Anderson, Meyer & Co............................................................... 171,698.68
American Trading Co. -- --·····----·--·----------·-······· ···········--·-----·-- -------37,210.03
Anderson, Meyer & Co. (Telegraph) --------··--------------·--------------54,613.08
Chinese $
Subtotal U. S. $

16,170,391.29
8,085,195.65

TOTAL U.S.$ 10,220,154.12

IV. AMERICAN PuRCHASES oF CHINESE SEcURITIEs IN EuRoPE
EsTIMATE oF FREDERic LEE

Chinese Government Reorganization Loan:
Russian Series ------- --·----·--------------------- -- -------- -------------- ----- --·--------$ 2,500,000.00
Paris and London Series.·-------------------------------------------------- -----250,000.00
Chinese Imperial Government Gold Loan of 1895.................... 2,000,000.00
Other Issues (Estimated)--------·---- -----·-----·------------------ ---------------- --- 4,250,000.00
Total

$ 9,000,000.00

V. REcENT LoANS (UNVERIFIED, NoT IN GRAND ToTAL):
Radio Corporation of America .. ·--------------------------------·------------------$ 170,000.00
(New York T i,m es, Nov. 7, Dec. 25, 1928)
GRAND TOTAL (omitting V.) $46,452,805.64
The reader is asked to consider the larger and the smaller of two totals
of American investments for 1929 which may be arrived at from the figures
presented. Taking the value of the property of American mission and philanthropic societies at $52 million, business investments at $30 million, and
American holdings of Chinese securities and the obligations of the Chinese
Government at $46 million, we arrive at an estimate of $128 million. Taking
the first at $80 million, the second at $100 million, and the third at $46
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million, we arrive at an estimate of $226 million. If now we eliminate the
property of mission and philanthropic societies on the ground that they are
not investments in the proper sense of the word, we may put the estimate of
American investments in China, from available information, at $146 million.
Certain conclusions and generalizations are offered, based upon the account of American investments in the preceding pages. These conclusions
are numbered for convenience in referring to them and not because I suppose
they can be withdrawn from the context or considered independently of
each other.
1. Throughout the hundred years ending in 1928 direct American business investments in China have been greater than any other form of American investment. The opinion may be ventured, from what we know of American foreign investments before 1914 and from the history of foreign investments in China, that direct business investments are an early stage in international capital movements.
2. Americans were late in entering the field of loans to the Chinese Government and in this field they have not been either important or successful.
A certain immaturity is revealed in the relation of the Americans to the old
Consortium and in the relation of the bankers to the State . Department.
Government initiative is not characteristic of American economic activity in
fields where the American business man is at home.
3. The geographical distribution of American business investments is
such as to put the center at Shanghai. American holdings of mission property are relatively greater in the southern part of China. American interest
in loans to the Chinese government has frequently centered attention upon
Manchuria. The explanation is, probably, that business investments have followed trade; that mission activities have been maintained where they got an
early start; and that loans to the Chinese Government have been the result
of the international political situation in the Far East.
4. The amount and distribution of American investment in China is,
largely, the result of the position of the foreigner in China in the past and
of America's pre-war place in the field of international finance. Significant
changes in both these respects have taken place and are taking place. We do
not yet know what consequences will follow.
I turn for a moment to wider considerations than those touching American investments only. Looking upon the flow of capital to China, one must
admit that it has not been great. The general reason I have stated to be the
passive resistance offered by the social, economic, and political organization
of Chin::t. To this must be added the international rivalries of the foreign
powers and the position of the foreigner in China. Investment has taken
two forms and the barriers to the free flow of capital may be observed in
each case. In the case of loans to the government, the barriers were the very
nature of the government and the jealous quarrels among the foreign powers.
The foreigners, one may say, brought to bear the psychology of the entering
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wedge. In the case of direct business investments the barriers have been the
relations which brought into existence the system of treaty ports and extraterritoriality and, behind these relations, the nature of the economic and
social organization of China.
Foreign investments in China have had political importance beyond their
economic importance, because the Chinese Government has, of necessity, been
involved, because foreigners and foreign business establishments ar'e concentrated in the treaty ports, and because the general result of foreign trade,
foreign investment and modern equipment in transportation and industry
have brought about the disintegration of traditional China.
One is tempted to say that if capital is to flow to China in considerable
quantities, a new means of getting it there must be worked out. It is difficult
to imagine that the capital for a great railway system could ever be introduced into China by the methods which have prevailed in the loan negotiations in the past. It is difficult to imagine that the capital for great industrial
development in China could be brought to China by direct private investments of foreigners in the open ports of the country. It does not follow
from this that international agreement concerning China and a changed position of the foreigner in China will make a fundamental difference. I believe
it to be generally true that the flow of capital from developed countries to
an undeveloped country is in accordance with the principle of capacity to
receive. The fundamental change will be in China's capacity to receive.

